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1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the decision by the arbitrator on suspension of
concessions (‘‘retaliation’’) in the dispute between the US and the EU
regarding the tax treatment of offshore corporate income under US
legislation. By way of background, the first part of the chapter (section 2)
describes the operation of the US scheme, including as revised after the
first round of WTO rulings.
We observe that the arbitrators have adopted an unconventional
approach with respect to the notion of countermeasures, which empha-
sizes the incentive to induce compliance while largely jettisoning pro-
portionality between the countermeasure and the injury suffered by the
wronged state as a meaningful normative constraint. Section 4 considers
this approach from the perspective of established principles of inter-
national law and highlights a number of important shortcomings.
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Section 5 takes this approach for granted and asks whether counter-
measures could actually be relied upon in order to induce compliance.
We conclude with respect to export subsidies, the incentives of
complainants are such that under-enforcement can often be expected.
The prospect of inducing compliance through countermeasures thus
appears to be somewhat poor and at odds with established principles of
international law.
2 Facts and procedure
This section first describes the operation of the US legislative scheme.
2.1 The original FSC scheme
A Foreign Sale Corporation (FSC) is a corporation established outside the
United States or in some US possessions, which is involved in the sales of
goods produced in the United States to foreign clients. These foreign sales
corporations are typically subsidiaries of US companies and benefit from
particular tax provisions under the US tax legislation. These provisions
were established by the Deficit Reduction Act, adopted by Congress in
1984. In order to understand the tax benefit that flows from these provi-
sions, some key features of the US tax system have to be described.
The US tax system is based on the residence principle, according to
which the income of US residents is taxed in the US, whatever the
geographical origin of the income. Hence, income generated outside the
US is normally taxable in the US. Other countries apply the source
principle, according to which income is taxed where it is generated. As a
consequence, if income is generated in a country that applies the source
principle but accrues to a beneficiary which is resident of a country
applying the residence principle, income could be taxed twice. In order
to avoid such double taxation, the US can either take into account the
taxes paid in foreign countries by giving a tax credit1 or can simply
exempt the income earned in foreign countries.2
In the case of capital income, taxes are typically paid both on the profit
of a corporation but also on the income of the shareholders of the
1 This is referred to as the ‘‘capital export neutrality’’ principle – because capital is subject
to the same tax, whether it is invested in the US or abroad.
2 This is referred to as the ‘‘capital import neutrality’’ principle, because capital invested in
a given country is subject to the same tax, whatever the location of its owner.
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corporation when profits are distributed. Hence, the issue of double
taxation arises both with respect to taxes of corporate profits (i.e. to what
extent should the profit of a subsidiary or related company abroad be
taxable in the US, where the parent is located) and taxes on shareholders’
income (i.e. to what extent should the distribution of profits from a
subsidiary or related company abroad to shareholders in theUS be taxable).
Let us consider the first question, namely whether profits of a sub-
sidiary or related company abroad should be taxable in the US. If those
profits are taxed abroad and if the US adopts the approach of exempting
foreign income, the definition of what can be considered as foreign
income matters a great deal: under such system, US corporations will
have an incentive to disguise income earned on domestic activities as
foreign income (for instance, by shifting profits to foreign corporations),
at least if the local tax on foreign income is very low. Hence, the US tax
legislation stipulates a comprehensive set of rules to distinguish between
income which is ‘‘effectively connected with a trade or business in the
United States’’ and that which is not. Only income which is not connected
with a trade or business in the United States can be exempted (will not be
considered as part of the income of the US parent).
Turning to the taxes on shareholders, the US tax code stipulates that
even if a foreign subsidiary or related company is not connected with a
trade or business in the United States, dividends will be taxable in the US.
There are also special provisions in the US tax code in order to avoid
permanent deferrals of the taxes (that would arise if profits are accumu-
lated abroad and never distributed). These provisions apply to companies
that are controlled by a US parent and stipulate that US shareholders have
to include their pro-rata share of profit of the foreign company in their
own income. This provision effectively eliminates the opportunity of
deferral for foreign companies that are controlled by shareholders resi-
dent in the US.
To sum up, the US tax legislation allows for the exemption of profits
accruing to subsidiaries or related companies abroad from US corporate
taxes as long as these companies are not connected with domestic activ-
ities but still impose taxes on dividends when these profits are repatriated.
In addition, the payment of taxes on dividends cannot be deferred in the
case of controlled companies.
The tax treatment of FSCs has four key features. First, a fraction of the
income earned by an FSC is considered as ‘‘not effectively connected with
a trade or business in the US’’ and is not subject to corporate taxes in the
US. This fraction is at least 30% and is automatic.
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Second, even though FSCs are typically controlled by US parents, the
rule that US shareholders (the US parent) should include their prorata
share of profit in their own income does not apply to FSCs. Hence,
deferral of distributed profits can take place.
Third, dividends of the FSC will be taxed in the US as long as these
dividends do not exceed the exempt income, i.e. the profit that is deemed
not to be connected with a trade or business in the US. For instance,
if that income accounts for 30% of the FSC’s total profit, as much as
30% of the profit can be distributed to shareholders without taxes on
dividends.
Fourth, the transfer prices between the FSC and its US parent are
subject to special rules, which allow for more flexibility than would be
allowed between domestic companies. These rules effectively enable the
US parents to locate a particularly high share of profits with the FSC.
2.2 The WTO procedure
The original FSC scheme was found to be inconsistent with the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), both by
the panel and the Appellate Body. The panel (upheld on this point by the
AB), found that the FSC scheme constitutes a prohibited export subsidy
under Art. 3 (1) a of the SCM agreement, essentially because in the absence
of the FSC scheme, the US tax authorities would have obtained higher
revenues (the tax exemptions under the FSC scheme result in the ‘‘fore-
going of revenues’’) and because the financial benefit conferred by the
FSC scheme was contingent upon export performance.
The DSB recommended that the US bring the disputed measures into
conformity with the Agreement and in particular eliminate the export
subsidy element that was found to exist in its taxation scheme.
The US passed a new law, the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000 (ETI Act). The United States and the EU disagreed as to whether this
new legislation in fact eliminated the illegal export subsidy element that
was impugned in the WTO proceedings.
The EU and the US had an understanding that (i) if the EU should
decide to have recourse to Art. 21.5 (involving a compliance panel), it
would also simultaneously request the imposition of countermeasures,
using Art. 22.6, (ii) that the US would object to those measures, (iii) that
the matter would be referred to arbitration and (iv) that the arbitration
would be suspended until completion of a first round of 21.5 procedure
(involving the adoption of a panel report and possibly an Appellate Body
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report). The parties thus committed to an arbitration procedure regard-
ing countermeasures, but only following the 21.5 procedure.
In the 21.5 case, both the panel and the Appellate Body found that the
ETI Act contained an export subsidy component and thus that the United
States had failed to bring itself into compliance. The final step that
remained was, then, a 22.6 arbitration on countermeasures, which is the
subject of this chapter.
3 The ruling
We first describe the relevant legal provisions before turning to the
concept of appropriate countermeasures developed by the arbitrators
and evaluation of the countermeasures proposed by the EU.
3.1 Relevant provisions
The arbitration takes the view that the rules of the DSUwith respect to the
evaluation of the countermeasures apply to the SCM, except in the
presence of specific rules (lex specialis).
In particular, Art. 22.7 of the DSU provides that
The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature
of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine
whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullifica-
tion or impairment
Whereas, Article 4.11 of the SCM agreement provides that
In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘‘DSU’’), the arbitrator
shall determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate*
(*original footnote n8 9. This expression is not meant to allow counter-
measures that would be disproportionate in light of the fact that the
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited).
The DSU provision thus focuses on the equivalence between the level of
suspension and the level of nullification or impairment whereas the SCM
focuses on whether countermeasures are appropriate. Much of the arbi-
trators’ comments are concerned with the interpretation of this last
provision, given that the parties proposed rather different interpretations.
The EU proposed countermeasures for about $4 billion, which corres-
ponded to its own estimate of the amount of the subsidy granted by the
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FSC legislation every year. The US considered that the trade impact on the
Member country concerned was the relevant benchmark to determine
whether the countermeasure was ‘‘appropriate’’. The US further con-
sidered that the value of the subsidy could be taken as a proxy for the
trade impact and hence that the proportion of the subsidy which affects
the EUwould be appropriate (using the share of exports to the EU in total
US exports as the relevant factor). The US also encouraged the arbitrators
not to use more sophisticated estimates of the trade impact (beyond the
value of the subsidy).
The EU argued that the SCM agreement stipulates a particular bench-
mark for what is appropriate which does not relate to the trade impact
but rather emphasizes the incentive to comply. The EU further considered
that the value of the subsidy is conservative in terms of this benchmark.
3.2 The concept of appropriate countermeasures
The arbitrators effectively adopted the approach advocated by the EU.
The arbitrators first note that countermeasures are meant (just as a
matter of language) to neutralize a measure but that neutralization could
be understood in terms of the measure itself or in terms of its effect.
The arbitrators then take the view that countermeasures in the context
of Art. 4.10 cannot be confined to redressing or neutralizing effects only.
The main argument in support of their approach relates to footnote 9 of
the SCM agreement, which provides some guidance of how ‘‘appropriate’’
should be understood. They find support for their approach in the
structure of the SCM agreement, which distinguishes between ‘‘pro-
hibited’’ subsidies, and subsidies that are ‘‘actionable’’, i.e. that may be
the subject of a complaint if it can be established that they cause certain
kinds of trade effects, but otherwise do not attract state responsibility.
Let us consider some of these arguments in more detail. The main
argument for not confining the evaluation of ‘‘appropriate’’ countermeas-
ures to an effects test (of which a trade test is just one version) rests on the
interpretation of footnote 9.
This footnote which indicates that ‘‘[appropriate] is not meant to allow
countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited’’, is a little
convoluted. It reads as if it sets an upper bound on the countermeasures
that can imposed (by not allowing them to be disproportionate). At the
same time, it emphasizes the unlawful character of the measure at stake,
which is an aggravating factor, and hence can be seen as warning against
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excessively low countermeasures or in other words as setting some lower
bound on the countermeasures. The arbitrators effectively emphasize this
second aspect. They observe that themeasures at stake (export subsidies) are
per se unlawful and hence that the imposition of such measures upsets the
balance of rights and obligations under theWTO agreement, independently
of their effects and in particular independently of the magnitude of their
trade effects. According to the arbitrators ‘‘this emphasis on the unlawful
character of the export subsidies invites . . . a consideration of the impact
that this unlawful character may have in itself ’’ (Para. 5.23). ‘‘It directs us to
consider the appropriateness of countermeasures under Art. 4.10 from this
perspective of countering a wrongful act and taking into account its essen-
tial nature as an upsetting of the rights and obligations as betweenMembers.
This, we conclude, is the manner in which we are directed to assess the
matter. We are not, by comparison, actually directed to, e.g., consider
demonstrated trade effects of the measure on the complaining Member.’’
Having established that appropriate countermeasures in the context of
Art. 4.10 do not have to be restricted to an effects test, the arbitrators
consider what alternative benchmark could be used. They find inspiration
in the object and purpose of the SCM agreement in relation to Art. 4.10
and those of the DSB. They observe that in this context, the DSB can only
recommend that the offending member withdraw its subsidy without
delay, and hence that the countermeasures, which contribute to the
objective of the DSB in the case of non compliance – should have the
same objective. Hence, countermeasures should be considered as an
incentive mechanism and whether they are ‘‘appropriate’’ should be
assessed in terms of whether they induce compliance, i.e. contribute to
the withdrawal of the subsidy.
The consequences of this determination should not be underestimated.
It implies, in particular, that what matters in evaluating the appropriate-
ness of countermeasures is not the effect on the importing country but
rather the effect on the exporting country: indeed, the amount of counter-
measure that will induce compliance should at least be equal to the benefit
that the exporting country obtains from the export subsidy. Hence, it is
perceived benefit to the exporting country that will provide an appro-
priate benchmark and not the cost incurred by the importing countries.
That is also to say that the arbitrators have not only argued that the trade
effects on importing countries cannot provide the only benchmark for
evaluating countermeasures but also proposed that the effects on the
exporting countries will provide a useful benchmark. This implication
however seems to have been lost on the arbitrators (see below).
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It is also worth noting that the concern about setting an upper bound
on the amount of countermeasures in Art. 4.10 (such that measures should
not be disproportionate) is of a second order if one takes the view that
countermeasures should be used as an incentive mechanism. Indeed, only
the lower bound will matter for the incentive mechanism: as long as the
penalty is sufficient to induce compliance, the magnitude of the penalty
will not matter – because it will not be applied (or it will be applied only
during a transition period). Hence, the fact that the arbitrators emphasize
the lower bound expressed in footnote 10, and tend to neglect the upper
bound, is consistent with the incentive approach that they develop.
The approach which is developed by the arbitrators can also be char-
acterized as one establishing a property rule rather than a liability rule. As
emphasized by Schwartz and Sykes (2002), a property rule is a mechanism
whereby a party needs to secure the permission of others before deviating
from its obligations. By contrast, a liability rule is a mechanism whereby a
party wishing to deviate from its obligations is only liable for the damages
that the deviation causes. According to Schwartz and Sykes (2002), the
main drawback of a liability rule is associated with the need to have a third
party evaluate the damages. The property rule avoids this difficulty but
may involve important transactions costs, associated with bargaining
between the state wishing to deviate and its victims.
3.3 Assessment of the countermeasures proposed by the EU
In evaluating whether the amount of the export subsidy is an appropriate
countermeasure, the arbitrators discuss whether it is in principle permis-
sible, analyze the countermeasure in relation with the subsidy and discuss
the extent to which the subsidy should be reduced by a factor that reflects
the relative importance for the EU as an export market.
The arbitrators find that the proposed countermeasures are in princi-
ple permissible because ‘‘they are tailored to the initial wrongful act they
are to counter’’ (Para. 6.11). The observation that countermeasures are
‘‘tailored’’ to the initial wrongful act arises, according to the arbitrators,
from the fact that the amount of the subsidy ‘‘– the expense incurred – is
the very essence of the wrongful act’’ (Para. 6.10).
Having established that a countermeasure which aims to ‘‘challenge
the wrongful act in itself’’ (Para. 6.11) is in principle permissible, the
arbitrators analyze the key elements of the wrongful act in order to
check whether the proposed countermeasures are indeed ‘‘not dispro-
portionate’’. In other words, the arbitrators attempt to derive some
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dimensions of the wrongful act along which proportionality can be
assessed.
The arbitrators identify two dimensions, namely the financial contri-
bution and the benefit to the recipients of the subsidy. With respect to the
former, the arbitrators observe that the identity between the export sub-
sidy and the countermeasure respects a form of proportionality (which
goes beyond the superficial appeal that equal numbers may have). They
note that the amount of the subsidy is the essential wrongful act of the
US government. As the EU cannot ‘‘thwart these expenses at source,’’ it
proposes to suspend a ‘‘numerically equivalent obligation which it owes
to the United States.’’ According to the arbitrators, ‘‘it appears . . . that is a
proper manner from which to judge the congruence of the counter-
measure to the measure at issue, i.e. to view it under its legal category:
on the one hand an expense to government of a certain value constituting
an upsetting of the balance of rights and obligations; and therefore, on the
other hand, a congruent duty imposed by a responding government as a
mirror withdrawal of an obligation’’ (Para. 6.19).
With respect to the benefits accruing to recipients, the arbitrators note
that the EU countermeasures could be viewed ‘‘as aiming to deprive US
firms of an advantage that they would otherwise receive in relation to
access to the EC market’’ (Para. 6.21). To the extent that the counter-
measures impose a cost on US firms, they could be seen as annulling or
‘‘counteracting’’ the benefit that they receive through the export subsidy.
The arbitrators note however that computing the amount of counter-
measures that would annul the benefits is hardly feasible (especially at the
firm level) but that a precise equivalence is not required given that the
justification for the countermeasure is to counteract the ‘‘legal breach as a
wrongful act’’ (Para. 6.22).
The arbitrators, observing that the EU has focused on the first dimen-
sion of the subsidy but that the US has not objected to that approach,
conclude that the countermeasures proposed are not disproportionate to
the initial wrongful act.
The approach followed by the arbitrators in evaluating the counter-
measures is surprising, to the extent that it seems to depart from the
principles established earlier. In particular, the arbitrators do not attempt
to apply the principle that countermeasures are meant to act as an
incentive mechanism to ensure compliance. They do not even refer to
this principle any longer.
One would have expected that in line with the logic of an incentive
mechanism, the arbitrators would have considered the penalty that is
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required in order to make it attractive for the US to withdraw the
measure. The only oblique reference to the logic of incentive can be
found in the discussion of benefits to US firms (Para. 6.21) – in which
the arbitrators find that a cost imposed on US firms commensurate with
the benefit that they receive from the export subsidy would be appro-
priate. Such a cost might presumably induce US firms to ask the US
government to remove the subsidy – and hence induce compliance.
However, the logic of the argument is not clearly spelled out.
As indicated above, the arbitrators also discuss whether the amount of
the countermeasure – evaluated as the subsidy – should be reduced to
reflect the relative importance of the EU as an export market. They
consider that such an approach would be inconsistent with the nature
of a per se obligation – which by definition is not a quantitative matter but
one of principle.
The arbitrators recognize that this approach may be problematic if
there were several WTO Members demanding countermeasures – but
effectively escape the problem by suggesting that they do not have to
consider a set of facts that is different from the facts that they are
confronted with. They note at the same time that the EU is open to the
possibility of sharing the ‘‘task’’ (sic) of applying countermeasures with
other WTO Members affected by the subsidies.
4 Countermeasures, compliance, and proportionality
In this section, we first recall some principles of international law with
respect to the definition of countermeasures. We subsequently consider
the approach of the arbitrators in light of these principles.
4.1 Countermeasures in international law
It is a well-established principle of international law that countermeasures
in response to an internationally wrongful act must be proportional to the
injury suffered by the state taking the countermeasures. This is now
reflected in Article 51 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility:
‘‘Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, tak-
ing into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the
rights in question.’’ While Article 49 of the ILC Articles states the purpose
of countermeasures as inducing compliance of the violating state, the
effect of Article 51 is to place an essential constraint on the quantity and
nature of countermeasures, such that even if a higher amount of
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countermeasures might serve the goal of inducing compliance, counter-
measures are limited to what is proportional to the injury suffered. As
Crawford puts it: ‘‘Proportionality is, . . . , a limitation even on measures
which may be justified under 49. In every case a countermeasure must be
commensurate with the injury suffered, including the importance of the
issue of principle involved, . . .’’ (Crawford (2002), p. 296; emphasis
added). In Cannizaro’s words, ‘‘the wording of Draft Article 51 clearly
indicates that the ILC conceives proportionality as a factor mitigating the
instrumental nature of countermeasures.’’ (Cannizzaro (2001), p. 894).
Customary international law and general principles of international
law govern the application and interpretation of WTO law, except where
there is an explicit contracting out of such rules evidenced by a provision
of the WTO treaties. (Korea – Government Procurement, Report of the
Panel; see also EC – Hormones, Report of the Appellate Body, discussing
the Precautionary Principle). Article 55 of the ILC Articles explicitly
recognizes that the ILC Articles do not apply to the extent that state
responsibility is governed by ‘‘special rules of international law.’’
As Crawford notes, ‘‘it will depend on the special rule to establish the
extent to which the more general rules on State responsibility set out in
the present articles are displaced by that rule.’’ (Crawford (2002), p. 307).
There are a number of respects in which the WTO ‘‘special rules’’ on
countermeasures obviously alter between the parties the law of counter-
measures set out in the ILC Articles. First of all, breach of a primary
obligation in a WTO treaty does not give rise to a right by the injured
party to take countermeasures; instead, the matter must be taken to
dispute settlement (DSU Article 23: US – Section 301, Report of the
Panel). Then countermeasures are only available to the party or parties
which have pursued dispute settlement proceedings, and only for the
breach of the secondary obligation to implement a dispute settlement
ruling that is binding on the parties. Such countermeasures must, further-
more, be authorized by an arbitral panel, and must not exceed the
nullification and impairment of benefits resulting from the failure to
implement the ruling. Thus, countermeasures may not be backdated to
the time of the breach of the primary obligation; the internationally
wrongful act that these countermeasures respond to is the secondary
obligation to implement a binding ruling of the DSB.
Countermeasures are available also for failure to implement a non-
violation nullification and impairment ruling; this illustrates perhaps
most dramatically of all the sense in which the internationally wrongful
act at which countermeasures are aimed is failure to implement, because,
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of course, in non-violation nullification and impairment cases, by defini-
tion, no violation of a primary obligation has been found.
The SCM Agreement contains an even more specialized set of rules on
countermeasures that apply to cases of failure to implement rulings on
prohibited subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Article 4.10 provides for
the authorization of ‘‘appropriate’’ countermeasures, where the recom-
mendation of the DSB is not followed within the time period specified by
the panel. Footnote 10 to Article 4.10 states that the wording ‘‘appro-
priate’’ is ‘‘not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate
in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited.’’
In understanding this footnote, one must contrast the treatment of
countermeasures with respect to prohibited subsidies under the SCM
Agreement with that of another category of subsidies, labelled ‘‘action-
able.’’ The obligation of WTO Members in the case of ‘‘actionable’’ sub-
sidies is one of result: in applying such subsidies, Members are required to
avoid certain ‘‘adverse effects.’’3 Where countermeasures are authorized
for failure to comply with a ruling on actionable subsidies, these counter-
measures must be ‘‘commensurate with the degree and nature of the
adverse effects determined to exist, . . .’’ (Article 7.8).
Footnote 9 to Article 4.10 makes it clear that in applying the notion of
proportionality in the case of prohibited subsidies commensurability of
countermeasures need not be measured against the existence of the
adverse effects that Members are obliged to avoid in respect of actionable,
as opposed to prohibited, subsidies. Nothing in the language of Footnote 9,
however, evinces a clear intent to do away, in the case of prohibited
subsidies, with the principle stated in ILC Article 51 that countermeasures
must be proportionate to the injury suffered. It is just that the drafters
wanted to make it clear that in applying the principle of proportionality,
the understanding of ‘‘injury’’ in the case of prohibited subsidies is not
limited to the kinds of adverse effects that make actionable subsidies
illegal. This makes sense when one considers that prohibited subsidies
3 These adverse effects are defined in the following terms in Article 5 of the SCM
Agreement as one or more of: ‘‘(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member
[footnote omitted]; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions
bound under Article II of GATT 1994 [footnote omitted]; (c) serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member [footnote omitted].’’ The concept of ‘‘serious prejudice,’’
defined in detail in SCM Article 6, ceased to apply after 1999, however, because of its
provisional nature, as set out in SCM Article 31.
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are export subsidies, whereas actionable subsidies are domestic subsidies;
export subsidies may have adverse economic effects different and beyond
those of domestic subsidies. In sum, ‘‘actionable’’ subsidies are themselves
illegal and prohibited to the extent that they cause the adverse effects
described in SCM Article 5; but because they are illegal only to the extent
that they cause those particular adverse effects, an adjudicator must regard
the adverse effects in question as an upper limit on countermeasures
(SCM Article 7.8). Footnote 9 to Article 4.10 merely indicates that in
the case of export subsidies, the proportionality of countermeasures must
be assessed in light of the fact that these subsidies are ‘‘prohibited’’ per se,
i.e. unlike ‘‘actionable’’ subsidies, prohibited regardless of whether the kind
of adverse effects described in SCM Article 5 can be demonstrated by the
complainant. But this hardly means that the injury to the defendant is
irrelevant in assessing countermeasures in the case of ‘‘prohibited’’ sub-
sidies; it is just that the adjudicator should not assume (as it is required to
do in the case of actionable subsidies by SCMArticle 7.8) that the injury is
limited to the adverse effects described in Art. 5 in regard to ‘‘actionable’’
domestic subsidies.
4.2 The analysis of the panel
The arbitral panel in FSC misrepresented and misapplied this legal
framework.
First of all, the panel took the reference to ‘‘prohibition’’ in Article 4.10,
Footnote 9 not as a signal that the conception of economic injury for
prohibited subsidies will be different from that for actionable subsidies,
but rather as a basis for throwing out the window any effort to gauge the
relationship of the subsidy to the injury suffered by the party requesting
countermeasures.
The panel thus began its analysis of proportionality by reference
to factors completely unrelated to the nature and extent of the injury
suffered by the state requesting countermeasures. It noted that the US
measure was ‘‘inherently destabilizing’’ or upsetting of the balance of
legal rights and obligations. But defined in those abstract terms, so is
any act in violation of a treaty norm; the whole basis of pacta sunt
servanda is that violations of treaty norms undermine legal security,
and the normative balance of rights and obligations. Such conse-
quences therefore do not in themselves suggest a particular level of
countermeasures, nor provide a basis for determining the gravity of a
breach.
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Thus, the panel was forced to make a leap of logic between the concept
of security and stability of the balance of legal rights and obligations to the
notion that this particular subsidy, being widely available, ‘‘creates sys-
tematic uncertainty and instability of expectations as to trading condi-
tions’’ (para. 6.9). But there is nothing in the SCMAgreement that entitles
a WTO Member to certainty and stability of trading conditions. Instead,
it has again and again been emphasized in WTO jurisprudence that, as a
general matter (and with the qualified exception of non-violation nulli-
fication and impairment complaints), WTO rules do not entitle Members
to fixed expectations of trading conditions, but only to legal certainty; the
expectation that Members will continue to act in compliance with the
specific constraints placed on their conduct in the treaties. (See US –
Section 301, Report of the Panel; EC – LAN Equipment, Report of the
Appellate Body).
In considering the ‘‘gravity’’ of the breach the arbitral panel placed
much weight on the fact that the export subsidies in question were
‘‘prohibited’’ per se under the SCM Agreement. But the categories of
‘‘prohibited’’ and ‘‘actionable’’ subsidies are merely terms of art in the
SCM Agreement. The fact that the obligation with respect to the former
category, export subsidies, is one of conduct whereas the obligation with
respect to domestic subsidies is one of result (avoidance of certain adverse
effects) does not in itself establish the special gravity of a violation of the
SCM provisions on export subsidies. The panel here seems to be relying
on a discredited notion in earlier versions of the draft ILC Articles that
obligations of conduct are stricter than obligations of result; a view that,
as Crawford explains, was explicitly rejected in the drafting of the final
version of the Articles. (Crawford (2003), pp. 21–23; and see P.-M.
Dupuy, ‘‘Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s
Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in
Relation to State Responsibility’’).
The fact is that both prohibited and actionable subsidies attract state
responsibility under the SCM Agreement.
In the case of actionable subsidies, there is a legal duty to ‘‘take appro-
priate steps to remove the adverse effects or . . .withdraw the subsidy’’
(7.8). As already noted, the failure to take such steps can result in counter-
measures, which must be commensurate with ‘‘adverse effects’’ as defined
in Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement. The only difference in the case
of ‘‘prohibited’’ subsidies is that countermeasures are not limited by the
concept of ‘‘adverse effects’’ in Articles 5 and 6. But it is a huge and
unjustified leap to infer from this that ‘‘prohibited’’ subsidies are not
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subject to the general rules of international law on proportionality to the
injury (admittedly a concept of injury that is not circumscribed by the
particular meaning of ‘‘adverse effects’’ that is defined in the case of
actionable subsidies in SCM 5 and 6).
It should be noted that most WTO obligations have been stated and
interpreted as obligations of conduct or means, not result; and never-
theless, in respect of these hundreds or thousands of obligations of
conduct, countermeasures are limited, under Article 22 of the DSU to
measures of equivalent effect to the defendant Member’s failure to
implement. In sum, the general countermeasures regime of the WTO is
inconsistent with the notion that the breach of an obligation of conduct
has a special gravity to it, justifying countermeasures that may be in
excess of the actual harm resulting from the failure to comply from a
ruling.
This of course assumes that the panel was even correct in considering
the gravity of the initial wrongful act, as opposed to the gravity of the
failure to implement the panel ruling. Since under theWTOmodification
of the general international law of state responsibility and countermeas-
ures, countermeasures are only available, as explained above, for the
failure to comply with a binding dispute settlement ruling, it is arguable
that the relevant wrongful act, the gravity of which must be considered, is
this failure to comply, not the initial act of subsidization, though the two
will have some relation, at least in certain cases.
Here it must be borne in mind that, as noted in the introductory
section of this report, the United States attempted once to reform its
FSC scheme to bring it into conformity with an initial Appellate Body
ruling, but these changes were deemed inadequate by the 21.5 compliance
panel, a finding upheld by the Appellate Body. When the revised scheme
was found not to be adequate as an implementation measure, the United
States engaged in serious negotiations with both domestic interests and
the EC, to find a solution satisfactory to all parties. As far as the US
behaviour goes after it was found not to be in compliance with its new
scheme, there is nothing to suggest aggravation of the breach entailed in
failing to implement. It should be noted that in any case the Appellate
Body never characterized the US as acting in bad faith or pursuing an
internationally wrongful purpose. Also, the FSC legislation is clearly
a very complex piece of legislation that has economic implications that
go beyond the context of trade, and relate to the entire corporate taxation
approach of the US. This does not, of course, excuse the US for failing to
implement the DSB ruling in a timely fashion; but it does suggest that
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there could be explanations for not doing so that do not suggest any
particular element of ‘‘bad faith’’ or egregious violation in the US behav-
iour, as the panel sometimes suggests, for example, referring to the US as
in ‘‘persistent violation’’ (paragraph 6.15).
Even if one sets aside these errors in applying the notion of gravity
of breach, an analysis of the intrinsic gravity of the breaching act does
not obviate the need to nevertheless consider, as well, the injury to the
party requesting countermeasures. Thus, to revert to ILC Article 51,
‘‘Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, tak-
ing into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the
rights in question (emphasis added).’’ This language cannot possibly
justify the panel’s conduct, which is to collapse the inquiry into injury,
into an assessment of the gravity of the internationally wrongful act. If
that were the intent, then Article 51 would refer only to commensurability
with the internationally wrongful act; the reference to the injury suffered
would be superfluous.
In any case, having ignored the basic notion of proportionality in
international law, that of commensurability with the injury suffered, the
panel invented its own conception of proportionality – how much it cost
the breaching state to violate its international obligations! There is some-
thing odd in this reversal – the quantum of countermeasures being
determined by the cost of the wrongful act to the perpetrator, not the
cost to the victim. Of course, there is usually some relationship between
the cost of a wrongful act to the perpetrator and the extent of harm to the
victim state; the more that a state spends on chemical weapons, all things
being equal, the greater the threat to other states. But the international law
requirement of proportionality in countermeasures is not intended sim-
ply to establish some kind of arithmetic relationship – or ratio – between
the wrongful act and the countermeasures, but rather to limit counter-
measures so that they do not exceed the injury to the victim state.4 The
arbitral panel was required by international law to address itself to
4 Countermeasures can almost always be expressed as some proportion or ratio: so for
example, in a dispute over wrongful treatment of aliens, the home state could demand
countermeasures of $1,000,000 for each alien improperly detained. There would be
a ‘‘manifest relationship of proportionality’’ in the manner in which the panel understands
proportionality, i.e. some kind of arithmetic ratio of countermeasures to the injury (the
more aliens improperly treated the higher the quantum) but this would in no way answer
the question of whether the countermeasures are disproportionate in the sense of
excessive in relation to the injury taking into account the gravity of the breach, which is
what is required by ILC Article 51.
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whether, in using the amount of the entire subsidy it would be imposing
an amount of countermeasures that exceeded the injury to the EC, prop-
erly understood. This the arbitral panel never did. By introducing other,
mostly spurious or irrelevant meanings of proportionality, it simply
avoided completely the question of the extent of injury to the state
requesting countermeasures.
In turning to the costs of the subsidy as an appropriate benchmark for
countermeasures, the arbitral panel sought to justify itself on the grounds
that ‘‘financial contribution’’ was one of the elements of the internation-
ally wrongful act in question, namely the continued provision of
a prohibited export subsidy (para. 6.13). However, according to the
SCM Agreement there is no element of wrongfulness whatsoever that
attaches to the mere act of providing ‘‘financial contribution.’’ Only where
the financial contribution provides a ‘‘benefit’’ to a specific domestic firm
or industry can any element of international wrongfulness attach to the
act of subsidization. Thus no possibility of misfeasance arises by virtue of
the ‘‘financial contribution’’ itself. The element of misfeasance is the
conferral of a benefit on a domestic industry, through a subsidy contin-
gent in law or in fact upon export performance. It is not as if some
element or degree of wrongfulness arises from the ‘‘financial contribu-
tion’’ alone.
Thus, if the panel were to follow its own logic correctly it would relate
the amount of countermeasures to the ‘‘benefit’’ – i.e. the competitive
advantage over general market conditions conferred on domestic firms in
consequence of the subsidy. Focusing on ‘‘benefit’’ would naturally lead to
an analysis of the kind of economic harm to foreign firms competing with
domestic US firms that was caused by the subsidy. And this in turn would
have been much more consistent with, and indeed required, an inquiry
into the nature and extent of the injury to the EC. At paragraph 6.21 of
its ruling, the panel shows some dim awareness that ‘‘benefit’’ might be
a more appropriate benchmark for assessing countermeasures than ‘‘finan-
cial contribution.’’ The panel dismisses this concern by collapsing the
notion of benefit into the notion of expense by the treasury, assuming
benefit can be measured by the expended money that is granted to the
firm. It is precisely such a move that was firmly rejected by the Appellate
Body in Canada – Aircraft: ‘‘. . .we believe that Canada’s argument that
‘cost to government’ is one way of conceiving of ‘benefit’ is at odds with
the ordinary meaning of Article 1.1(b), which focuses on the recipient and
not on the government providing the financial contribution.’’ (para. 154;
emphasis in original).
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4.3 The prohibition of export subsidies as an ‘‘Erga Omnes’’ obligation
The failure of the panel to consider properly whether countermeasures in
the total amount of the financial contribution would be disproportionate
to the injury suffered by the EC is particularly egregious when one
considers that the financial cost of the subsidy extended to all firms
doing business everywhere in the world, not just the EC. In fact, the
United States was prepared to go along with the use of an amount
based upon financial cost of the subsidy, provided that amount was
prorated to reflect the EC’s total percentage of total trade with the US.
In other words, the US was prepared to accept an amount of counter-
measures that equalled the amount of subsidization that could reasonably
have been expected to have an effect on the EC’s markets.
At this point, the reasoning of the panel seems, at best, convoluted. To
begin with, the panel stated that it viewed the prohibition on export
subsidies as an erga omnes obligation to the entire community, of a kind
such that the level of countermeasures should take into account the harm
to the community, and not simply the injury to the state requesting the
countermeasures.
A prohibition on export subsidies cannot plausibly be an erga omnes
obligation. Erga omnes obligations are considered to be largely co-extensive
with ius cogens, peremptory norms of international law such as the
prohibitions on torture and genocide. (Pauwellyn (2002)).
What the panel had in mind was, more likely, the concept of an erga
omnes partes obligation, i.e. an obligation owed not only to each Member
of the WTO individually, but to the entire Membership as a collectivity.
As Pauwellyn notes, according to the Commentary on the ILC Articles,
‘‘[the]. . . principal purpose [of erga omnes partes obligations] will be to
foster a common interest, over and above any interests of the States
concerned individually.’’(Commentary, pp. 320–321, para (7)). Obligations
in human rights and environmental treaties have been considered erga
omnes partes: these obligations embody some universal principle or seek
some global public good.
While, according to Pauwellyn, there are some elements of collective
interest in WTO obligations, in most cases their principal purpose is to
serve and protect the interests of individual Member states. The Preamble
to the WTO Agreement states some common purposes or interests such
as ‘‘allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, . . .’’, but makes it clear that
the way in which the WTO contributes to such common interests is
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through ‘‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade . . .’’
(emphasis added). Thus, while they may serve some common interests
and objectives, the nature of WTO obligations, generally speaking, is that
they are ‘‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous.’’
Pauwellyn admits that there may be some obligations in the WTO
Agreements (of an institutional framework nature) that could correctly be
characterized as erga omnes partes; we do not necessarily agree with
Pauwellyn’s every characterization of a WTO obligation as bilateral.
A full engagement with his position is beyond the scope of this Report.
The panel, however, simply pulled out of a hat the notion that the
prohibition on export subsidies is erga omnes partes. It failed to make
any analysis whatever of the meaning of this concept (perhaps because it
got the concept confused in the first place with erga omnes).
Is, then, the prohibition on export subsidies an erga omnes partes? Here,
we return to the observation that export subsidization is only prohibited
in the SCM agreement to the extent that it confers a ‘‘benefit’’; in other
words, such subsidization is only wrongful to the extent that it confers a
competitive advantage beyond that which the entities in question would
normally enjoy in the marketplace.
Why should conferring such a competitive advantage be internation-
ally wrongful? This could only be so because of the effects on the eco-
nomic interests of other states, i.e. the relative competitive positions of
firms and industries in other WTO Member states. It is true that, in the
case of export subsidies, unlike other subsidies, these effects are assumed
once a benefit has been established, but such an assumption is reasonable
where the subsidy is contingent on export. By knowing that a subsidy is
a subsidy on exports, and that it confers a ‘‘benefit,’’ i.e. a competitive
advantage in respect of the exported products, we know that it is likely to
affect competition in foreign markets.5 It is for this reason that proof of
adverse effects on other WTO Members is not required to establish a
violation. Contrary to what the arbitral panel apparently thinks, it is not
that export subsidies are somehow wrongful regardless of their effects on
5 By contrast domestic subsidies may be aimed at capturing positive externalities (public
goods) within the domestic market, e.g. R and D. They may be conferred on firms that do
not trade internationally at all, or in areas of the economy where there is no significant
import competition from other WTO Members. It is thus understandable that these
domestic subsidies would only be wrongful, if shown to have the result of adverse affects
on other WTO Members.
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trade of individualWTOMembers. It is that, taken together, the facts that
exports are targeted and that a benefit (competitive advantage) is con-
ferred lead to Res Ipse Loquitur with respect to adverse affects on other
WTO Members.
The conclusion with respect to prohibition on export subsidies is that
this WTO obligation is principally aimed at protecting the economic
interests of individual WTO Members, by preventing a Member from
providing its own exports with an artificial competitive advantage in the
markets of other WTOMembers or third countries where that Member’s
exports are competing with those of other WTO Members.
But, to return to an issue raised earlier in this Report, the panel merely
assumes that the obligation for violation of which countermeasures can
be authorized under WTO law is the primary obligation, i.e. prohibition
of export subsidies and not the secondary obligation to implement an
adopted panel and/or Appellate Body ruling that the primary obligation
has been violated.
Is this secondary obligation erga omnes partes? There is a community
interest in the rule of law that is served by implementation of adopted
reports and disserved by non-implementation; this is reflected in DSU
21.1, which states ‘‘Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings
of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to
the benefit of all Members.’’(emphasis added). On the other hand, DSU
describes dispute settlement as aiming at a ‘‘prompt settlement of situ-
ations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it
directly or indirectly . . . are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member . . .’’ This language seems to make it clear that, while there is a
community interest in compliance, the fundamental or primary interest
at stake in dispute settlement is that of individual WTO Members
in respect of measures taken by other Members. Thus, it is established
in GATT/WTO practice that dispute settlement rulings are only legally
binding between the parties, and not legally binding on the Membership
as a whole, or the WTO as an organization (Japan – Alcohol).
Only a party to the initial proceedings may thus demand counter-
measures; and this follows from the fact that the ruling that the defendant
is failing to implement is binding on that Member only as a party to that
proceeding, and not by virtue of being a Member of the WTO.
In sum, neither the primary nor the secondary obligation can reason-
ably be considered an obligation erga omnes partes.
In addition to the argument that the prohibition on export subsidies
was an erga omnes (partes) obligation, the arbitral panel also justified its
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decision to not to adjust the total amount of countermeasures in light of
the EC’s percentage of global trade on the theory that the higher level of
countermeasures would ‘‘have the practical effect of facilitating prompt
compliance by the United States.’’ However, as pointed out earlier in this
analysis, proportionality as expressed in ILC Article 51 limits the level of
countermeasures, even where a higher level might contribute to the
legitimate objective of compliance.
Finally, disingenuously, the panel attacked the United States’ argument
that the amount of the countermeasures should be adjusted in light of the
EC share of world trade on the grounds that this kind of method for
calculating countermeasures would be ‘‘arbitrary.’’ Why? ‘‘It simply pre-
sumes a one to one correspondence of dollar of subsidy to dollar of trade
impact.’’ (paragraph 6.9). But of course this is what the panel itself
assumed in the first place in resorting to the total amount of the subsidy
as the measure of injury (albeit to the entire Membership, on the erga
omnes partes theory).
4.4 Alternative approaches to quantum
The Panel considered alternative approaches to calculating countermeas-
ures, based on estimates of injury to the EC rather than the amount of
subsidy; such approaches were in fact on the evidentiary record, presum-
ably because the parties had some awareness that, in international law,
proportionality cannot be evaluated without reference to injury to the
victim state. The panel noted that at least on one approach to calculating
the adverse effects on the EC, the amount could actually be higher than
the total amount of the subsidy. It asserted that the United States had not
been persuasive in showing that a better methodology would result in an
amount of adverse effects on the EC below that of the total amount of
the subsidy. Here the reasoning of the panel is as follows: the EC has
proposed the entire amount of the financial contribution as the quantum
of countermeasures; the United States has not proven that a clearly
superior methodology for estimating the injury to the EC from the
subsidy would result in a lesser amount; therefore, even if the amount
of the subsidy is an arbitrary consideration in relation to injury, there is
no compelling reason to reject the EC request. This seems to be an
alternative basis for the panel’s entire ruling, one that has nothing to
do with the panel’s earlier argument that the amount of the subsidy
is directly related to the gravity of the breach and the injury, and that it
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is appropriate, because we are dealing with an erga omnes partes obliga-
tion, to base countermeasures on the injury to the entire WTO
community.
While in fact this alternative theory of the ruling actually contradicts
the prior analysis of the panel, it does at least have the advantage of being
supported by precedent. In the Brazil – Aircraft case, the arbitral panel
accepted the amount of the subsidy as the appropriate amount of coun-
termeasures, observing that it was up to Brazil, the country challenging
the amount of the countermeasures, to show that this amount was not
‘‘appropriate.’’ The effect, according to the arbitral panel, was that in the
case of the evidence being ‘‘in equipoise’’ Brazil would lose its claim of
inappropriateness (Paras. 2.8–2.9).
Is this understanding of the burden of proof jurisprudentially sound? It
is true that the effect of SCM 4.10–4.11 is that it will often be up to the
state that is the target of countermeasures to challenge the quantum in
arbitration; this is because 4.10 provides that the DSB shall directly
authorize countermeasures, unless a Member seeks arbitration. Thus,
where the DSBmay be inclined to grant the countermeasures as requested
by the Member that is victim of a breach, arbitration would only be likely
to be invoked by the Member that is the target of the intended counter-
measures to challenge the quantum. Thus, as a general matter it will be up
to the party challenging the countermeasures to show that they are not
‘‘appropriate.’’
However, footnote 10 to 4.11 says that disproportionate countermeas-
ures are not allowed; the arbitratormust not read the word ‘‘appropriate’’
in 4.11 to allow disproportionate countermeasures. This footnote, when
considered in conjunction with the categorical requirement of propor-
tionality in ILC Article 51, suggests that even if the party challenging the
countermeasures has not as a general matter proven that they are
inappropriate, the arbitrator must nevertheless insure that the counter-
measures are not disproportionate. In other words, disproportionality
is an exception to the general presumption that countermeasures pro-
posed by the victim state are ‘‘appropriate’’ subject to the violator state
showing otherwise. This would be consistent with the fact that, as
Crawford puts it, ‘‘Article 51 establishes an essential limit on the taking
of countermeasures’’(p. 294). It is also consistent with the notion, sug-
gested by Cannizzaro, that the principle of proportionality is aimed
in some degree at curbing the traditional freedom of the victim state
to assert countermeasures according to its own subjective standard
(E. Cannizzaro (2002) p. 895).
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5 Can countermeasures induce compliance?
As discussed above, the arbitrators suggested that countermeasures
should be considered as part of a property rule, i.e. as an incentive
mechanism, and imply in their ruling that considerations of proportion-
ality between the countermeasures and the injury suffered are secondary
and subordinate to the overall goal of achieving compliance. This section
discusses how compliance could be induced by countermeasures, and in
particular countermeasures that could be applied by several countries.
Here we assume that proportionality does not constrain the capacity of
a state to take all countermeasures that might contribute to the goal of
compliance. We conclude that in many circumstances, the application
of countermeasures will lead to insufficient compliance; that is, member
countries will optimally select countermeasures which do not induce
the removal of the unlawful export subsidy. Even if several members
apply countermeasures simultaneously, under-enforcement will occur
in equilibrium. The concern that countermeasures should be scaled by
the importance of trade between the country imposing the countermea-
sures and the country granting unlawful subsidies in order to avoid
excessive countermeasures thus appears to be unfounded. At the oppo-
site, under-enforcement (lack of compliance) will occur even when sev-
eral countries impose countermeasures simultaneously without upper
bound on the amount of countermeasures that they impose. However,
under-enforcement will also take place in circumstances where it is
efficient (from a welfare perspective), i.e. when export subsidies increase
welfare. Paradoxically, letting the ‘‘victims’’ of export subsidies choose
countermeasures will lead to unlawful but efficient subsidies. That is also
to say however that the implementation of a property rule would allow for
efficient breach.
The intuition for this is straightforward: export subsidies often bring
benefits to the country granting them which are in excess of the cost that
they impose on importing countries.6 To the extent that countermeasures
take the form of export subsidies in another sector,7 they will have
the same property and hence bring benefits to the country imposing
them that are larger than the cost that they impose on the offending
6 We are not claiming that this property holds with respect to the export subsidies that the
FSC scheme involves.
7 Alternatively, countermeasures may take the form of import tariffs in the same sector (see
below).
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country.8 In those circumstances, the country imposing countermeasures
will find it optimal to set countermeasures at the highest possible level
which does not induce compliance. When several countries are involved,
there will be a continuum of Nash equilibria, where importing countries
(acting as multiple principals towards a common agent9) jointly impose
the highest level of countermeasures that does not induce compliance.
The argument is developed formally in box 1 but it can be illustrated
with a numerical example. Assume that country C grants an export
subsidy, which brings a net benefit (additional profits less the subsidy)
of 100. This subsidy imposes a cost to countries A and B, equal to 40 for
each country (hence, 80 overall, so that costs are 80% of the benefit). As
long as the importing countries impose countermeasures which, collect-
ively brings them a benefit which is less than 125 (i.e. 100/0.8), and hence
impose a cost on country C which is less than 100 (assuming that costs are
again 80% of the benefit), country C will not comply. If they achieve this
they will obtain (collectively) a surplus of 45 (i.e. 125–80) and the country
that has imposed an unlawful subsidy will have no surplus left. Can the
importing countries achieve this outcome non-cooperatively? Yes, as long
as each importing country imposes countermeasures which bring a posi-
tive net surplus, each country will prefer not to impose countermeasures
which would trigger compliance (taking the countermeasure of the other
countries as given). Hence, any pair of countermeasures which brings a
positive net surplus to each country will constitute mutual best replies.
So far we have assumed that countermeasures take the form of export
subsidies in another sector. Whether this form of countermeasure is
allowed is however not clear. In principle, countermeasures can take the
form of the suspension of tariff concessions or ‘‘other obligations’’. What
‘‘other obligations’’ may include has not been clearly delineated by the
case law and may not exclude the obligation not to introduce export
subsidies (so that retaliation could take the form of export subsidies). In
any event, the argument presented above would seem to extend to the case
of the suspension of tariff concessions. Indeed, the introduction of export
subsidies will shift the industry equilibrium in a way which is favorable to
the exporting country and damaging to importers. If importers are
allowed to introduce import tariffs, they will always be in a position to
implement the initial equilibrium (before the introduction of the export
8 Here again, we are not claiming that the EU can implement countermeasures which have
this property in the context of the case at hand.
9 See Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
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subsidies). This outcome will of course be preferable to them (they have
the same consumer and producer surplus but gain some tariff revenues)
so that they will fall short of inducing compliance.10
This reasoning has several implications. First, it suggests that complain-
ants cannot be relied upon in order to induce compliance. When the
incentive structure is such that the cost of an export subsidy is less than
the benefit that it confers on the exporting countries, an arbitrator will
have to grant countermeasures in excess of what the complainants seek in
order to induce compliance. He will also face an issue of commitment as
the complainants will have an incentive to implement a level of counter-
measures short of what the arbitrators will decide. The arbitrators will
have to monitor the imposition of countermeasures and compliance by
the country imposing the unlawful export subsidy.
Second, the argument suggests that the implementation of a property
rule does not necessarily imply large bargaining costs. The dispute settle-
mentmechanism imposes a structure of move which yields an outcome in
which the state wishing to deviate is left without surplus but in which
breach takes place. Importantly, this outcome can take place even if the
number of states that suffer from breach is large. These observations
certainly suggest that the main drawback of a property rule, namely the
importance of bargaining costs, may not be significant if bargaining is
properly structured. By the same token, it suggests that a property rule
may be superior to a liability rule.
Third, it appears that considering countermeasures in the context of a
property rule would allow for efficient breach.
Finally, it appears that export subsidies and associated countermeasures
can be used as a mechanism to induce multi-lateral export subsidies.
Indeed, in the equilibrium that we describe, the country introducing the
initial export subsidy is left without surplus while the complainants obtain
(collectively and individually) a positive surplus. In equilibrium, all
countries thus impose export subsidies. Consider now a repetition of
‘‘subsidy and countermeasure’’ stage game, where at each iteration one
country imposes an export subsidy, which is subsequently subject to
countermeasures falling short of inducing compliance. One expects to
see the emergence of ‘‘collusive outcome’’ in such a repeated game where
countries effectively introduce subsidies that yield no surplus in order to
allow others to implement countermeasures which bring a positive surplus.
10 We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell for pointing out this argument to us.
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Box 1. A simple model of countermeasures
We first illustrate that export subsidies can bring benefits in excess of the cost
that they impose. Consider for instance a Cournot duopoly with homoge-
nous goods, such that firms sell only in the domestic economy. Let c1 and
c2 be the marginal cost of respectively foreign and domestic firms and let s
be the (unit) export subsidy granted to the foreign firm. Denote ~c1 as
the ‘‘effective’’ marginal cost of the foreign firm, i.e. its marginal cost less
the unit subsidy. Welfare in the foreign country is given by profits less the
subsidy and in the domestic economy it is given by the sum of the profit of
the domestic firm and consumer surplus. Assume further that the marginal
costs of the two firms are identical. Standard calculations confirm that in
those circumstances, the fall in the domestic welfare following the imposition
of a marginal subsidy (from zero) is less than the increase in foreign welfare.
That is also to say that the export subsidy increases overall welfare. This arises
because the export subsidy tends to correct the inefficiency associated with
imperfect competition such that output is excessively low.
Consider now a game where at time t1 country C can choose between a
subsidy of zero and a subsidy of s, which brings a net benefit VðsÞ. The cost
incurred by two importing countries (A and B) are denoted respectively
cAðsÞ and cBðsÞ;with
cAðsÞ þ cBðsÞ5VðsÞ (1:1)
At time t2, countries A and B can select countermeasures denoted sA and sB,
whichbringrespectivebenefitsofVðsAÞ and VðsBÞ and imposeacostoncountry
C which is denoted cðsAÞ and cðsBÞ;with cðsAÞ5VðsAÞ; cðsBÞ5VðsBÞ:
At time t3, country C can decide to remove the subsidy. If subsidies are
removed, all countries get a payoff equal to zero. If the subsidies are not
removed, each country incurs the cost and obtains the benefit associated with
prevailing subsidies and countermeasures.
The decision of country C at time t3 is straightforward. It will remove the
subsidy as long as
cðsAÞ þ cðsBÞ > VðsÞ (1:2)
We adopt the (technical) assumption that if the cost of countermeasure is
equal to the benefit of the initial subsidy, country C will prefer not to comply.
Consider now the decisions of countries A and B with respect to sA and sB
at time t2. We show that there is always an equilibrium ð^sA; s^BÞ such that
neither A, nor B induce compliance, i.e. such that cð^sAÞ þ cð^sBÞ5VðsÞ and
such that
V ð^sAÞcAðsÞ > 0;V ð^sBÞcBðsÞ > 0: (1:3)
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Assume that country B imposes a countermeasure s
_
B such that it prefers
not to induce compliance, i.e. such that V ð^sBÞcBðsÞ ¼ 0. We consider the
best reply of country A, and show that it can obtain a positive payoff by not
inducing compliance either. If it does not induce compliance, the best that
country A can do is to choose a level of countermeasure such that (1.2) is met
as a strict equality. Hence, using (1.1) and replacing VðsÞ as an equality from
(1.2), one obtains:
cAðsÞ þ cBðsÞ5cð s_AÞ þ cð s_BÞ
Using that V ð^sBÞ ¼ cBðsÞ, and, cð s_AÞ5Vð s_AÞ one obtains that:
cAðsÞ þ V ð^sBÞ5Vð s_AÞ þ cð s_BÞ
And hence, given that cð s_BÞ5;Vð s_BÞ, we have that cAðsÞ5Vð s_AÞ. Hence,
country A will be better off not to induce compliance. Finally, note that if A
does not induce compliance, it is indeed also a best reply for B not to induce
compliance (i.e. to implement s
_
B). Hence, there is a Nash equilibrium in
which neither A nor B induce compliance. One can also further describe the
set of equilibrium countermeasures that do not induce compliance. Denote
s
^
B as the optimal countermeasure imposed by B when country A imposes
a countermeasure such that Vð s^AÞ ¼ cAðsÞ, i.e. such that it has no surplus.
ð s^A; s^BÞ is also a Nash equilibrium. For any sA 2 s^A; s_A
h i
, there will be
some sB 2 s_B; s^B
h i
, such that equilibrium conditions ((1.2) and (1.3)) hold.
This follows simply by continuity of the equilibrium conditions. The shape
of the frontier will be depend on the shape of Vð:Þ and Cð:Þ:
Let us finally consider the decision of country C at time t1. In equilibrium,
it will obtain no surplus.Wemake the assumption that it prefers to introduce
an export subsidy for instance because it obtains some transitory benefits in
between t1 and t2.
6 Conclusion
Overall, this chapter has argued that a property rule approach to counter-
measures does not sit comfortably with established principles of inter-
national law. The chapter has however also highlighted the attraction of
such an approach, to the extent that it would allow for efficient breach
even in the presence of a large number of parties.
The implementation of a property rule approach to countermeasures
may still be difficult in practice. The distribution of rents between victims
may for instance raise some difficult issues. As argued above, victims may
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be able to achieve an equilibrium where the countermeasures that they
claim do not induce compliance. There are however many such equilibria
which correspond to different distributions of countermeasures. This
may very well lead to a race to the courthouse. To protect their interest
in eventually being awarded countermeasures, WTO Members will want
to sue now, lest some other Member get there first, and receive all the
countermeasures.
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